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The Efficiency of Producing Alcohol for Energy 
in Brazil: Comment 
In a 1982 issue of this journal, Michael Barzelay and Scott R. Pearson 
examined the social costs and benefits of producing ethanol motor fuel 
in Brazil.' They conclude that ethanol fuel was economically infeasible 
in 1981 and will remain so unless petroleum prices rise dramatically in 
the future. We seek first to call attention to some problems in their data 
and second to suggest that their analysis include broader considera- 
tions. Quite different conclusions could result. 
Ethanol Costs of Production Data 
Barzelay and Pearson base their analysis on the published production 
costs of COPERSUCAR, the prominent and respected sugar mill 
cooperative in Sao Paulo and Parani.2 Without question, COPER- 
SUCAR has the most complete data-reporting network on sugar costs 
in Brazil. But what should be questioned is whether its data are appro- 
priate for Barzelay and Pearson's purposes. Two points are notewor- 
thy: 
First, COPERSUCAR, in addition to being a first-class agricul- 
tural research institute, represents the political interests of its sugar 
mill owners. A key lobbying effort arises before each harvest when the 
federal government sets official prices for sugarcane, sugar, and 
ethanol. Clearly, it is in the interests of the cooperative to promote high 
prices for its outputs of sugar and ethanol, and it thus annually pub- 
lishes its expected costs well in advance of the pricing decision. Bar- 
zelay and Pearson correctly note this fact and reduce COPER- 
SUCAR's reported costs by 20% "to compensate for the suspected 
overestimation of the published data" (p. 135). It is unclear how the 
authors arrive at the 20% figure, and the issue of ethanol efficiency 
appears rather sensitive to this parameter (see n. 9 below).3 
Second, the cooperative's membership, and hence its survey, is 
made up almost exclusively of sugar mills and their annexed distil- 
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TABLE 1 
NATIONAL ALCOHOL PROGRAM: PROJECTS APPROVED BY CENAL, 1975-81 
TYPE OF DISTILLERY 
Annexed Autonomous 
Additional Capacity Additional Capacity 
(millions of (millions of 
REGION N liters/year) N liters/year) 
North-Northeast 61 884.9 63 1,710.8 
Central-South 122 2,374.6 144 3,135.0 
Total 183 3,259.5 207 4,845.8 
SOURCE.-CENAL (May 1981). 
leries.4 The alcohol being produced is largely anhydrous ethanol, 
which is 99.6% water-free and suitable for mixing with gasoline in 
conventional motors. As table 1 shows, however, over 50% of the 
ethanol projects approved by the Executive National Alcohol Commis- 
sion (CENAL) during 1975-81 were autonomous distilleries largely 
producing hydrated ethanol.5 Hydrated ethanol contains up to 6% wa- 
ter and may be burned directly in motors designed for its use. It is 
cheaper to produce than anhydrous because it provides more volume 
and does not require an expensive benzine "stripping" to remove the 
final percentages of water. COPERSUCAR itself estimates that in an- 
nexed distilleries hydrated ethanol is 4.5% cheaper to produce than 
anhydrous.6 For this reason and others, Barzelay and Pearson's analy- 
sis of social profitability for 1980-81 needs refining. 
Social Profitability, 1980-81 
Using their data, I recalculated social profitability in 1980-81, account- 
ing for differences between anhydrous and hydrated ethanol. Their 
"base case" cost of US$0.24 per liter of ethanol is assumed to refer to 
anhydrous ethanol because their original cost estimates were for this 
fuel, and the text mentions adjustments in this cost relating only to 
higher petroleum prices.7 One may calculate conservatively that the 
cost of hydrated ethanol is therefore $0.23 per liter (4.5% below anhy- 
drous costs). 
As the authors correctly note, anhydrous ethanol may replace 
gasoline on a one-for-one basis when mixed with gasoline (up to 30%). 
Hydrated ethanol, on the other hand, does not substitute one-for-one 
when burned directly, because 20% more is necessary to provide the 
same mileage as gasoline. At a 1981 world price of petroleum at $34 per 
barrel, the per-liter price of gasoline is $0.24 in real terms. Thus the 
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TABLE 2 
SOCIAL COSTS AND RETURNS, 1980-81 
TYPE OF ETHANOL 
Anhydrous Hydrated 
Costs .24 .23 
Returns .24 .20 
Net losses .00 .03 
NoTE.-Figures in US$ per liter. 
social value of anhydrous ethanol (substituted volume for volume for 
gasoline) is $0.24. The social value of hydrated ethanol (substituted at a 
rate of 1.2 to 1.0) is $0.20.8 
The recalculated social costs and returns in 1980-81 are quite 
different from those reported by Barzelay and Pearson (see table 2). 
The anhydrous ethanol production was indeed viable in 1980-81, and 
the net social loss in hydrated ethanol was almost one-half that re- 
ported in the original article.9 
The conclusion that hydrated ethanol is not economical is borne 
out by other research. 1 However, though Barzelay and Pearson note 
some of the beneficial externalities arising from hydrated ethanol pro- 
duction, they are arguably not the most important. 
Externalities 
Proilcool is the Brazilian National Alcohol Program. Although many of 
its social objectives have not been realized," key strategic and eco- 
nomic goals are closer to fulfillment as a result of ethanol production. 
National Energy Security 
Brazil imported about 80% of the petroleum it needed in 1980, and 79% 
of these imports came from the Middle East. 12 The first strategic bene- 
fits of ethanol were realized sooner than expected when war broke out 
between Iran and Iraq in September 1980. Virtually overnight, 40% of 
petroleum imports were cut off. A difficult period ensued, but by rais- 
ing the proportion of alcohol in gasoline to 30%, instituting conserva- 
tion measures, and making spot purchases df petroleum, a major eco- 
nomic and political crisis was averted. This year ethanol is expected to 
substitute 37% for gasoline, according to official projections.13 
Emphasizing production of export crops such as sugar or soy- 
beans-instead of ethanol-to earn foreign exchange would have had 
disastrous results for Brazil because of the world recession and over- 
production.14 Thus ethanol continues to provide a cushion of domestic 
liquid fuel, which contributes to national energy security.15 
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Promotion of Consumer and Capital Goods 
Industries and Exports 
Proilcool was instrumental in maintaining automotive sales at approxi- 
mately one million units per year during 1975-80, according to plan- 
ning minister Delfim Neto.16 Consumer acceptance of all-ethanol cars 
has increased dramatically with the elimination of starting and corro- 
sion problems found in earlier models. Demand has also depended on 
financial considerations (lower taxes on ethanol fuel and improved 
engine efficiency) as well as on considerations of future gasoline versus 
ethanol supplies. Whereas total automobile sales fell to 700,000 units in 
1982, ethanol cars in mid-1983 accounted for 80% of total sales.17 
Proilcool has also stimulated capital goods production. With few 
exceptions, the 300 distillery projects built or in progress utilize grind- 
ing mills, distillation columns, pumps, tanks, cranes, furnaces, convey- 
ors, generators, and other equipment manufactured in Brazil. The ex- 
pertise gained in ethanol capital goods production and the chemical 
process has enabled Brazil to become an exporter of such equipment to 
developing countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Costa Rica, 
and Paraguay.18 
Although a breakdown of distillery equipment exports alone was 
not available, total Brazilian exports of furnaces, mechanical instru- 
ments, and machines grew 25% from 1979 to 1982. Export earnings in 
1982 amounted to US$1.2 billion.'9 
Conclusion 
A recalculation of ethanol costs and benefits and the inclusion of bene- 
ficial externalities favorably alters the conclusions to be drawn about 
Proilcool in 1981. More recently, petroleum prices have fallen; so 
presumably have the real costs of producing ethanol (measured by the 
opportunity cost of resources that would otherwise be idle because of 
the world sugar glut). Proilcool is providing stable and increased rural 
employment at a time when sugar prospects are bleak for the short and 
long term (see n. 14). Even a net loss in hydrated ethanol production, 
as noted above, must be considered in the light of national strategic and 
economic interests. 
Certainly any alternative energy program is risky: the potential 
payoff depends on events or situations that are largely unforeseeable 
and uncontrollable (e.g., stability within OPEC and the Middle East 
over the next 5 years). Under these circumstances, ethanol acts bene- 
ficially as a small insurance policy for promoting continued industrial 
and rural development. That there may be a price to pay for this "in- 
surance" does not necessarily invalidate the program.20 
JONATHAN WIGHT 
University of Richmond 
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Notes 
1. Michael Barzelay and Scott R. Pearson, "The Efficiency of Producing 
Alcohol for Energy in Brazil," Economic Development and Cultural Change 
31 (October 1982): 131-44. All subsequent references to this article will be 
parenthetical in text. 
2. The proper name is Cooperativa Central dos Produtores de Agucar e 
Alcool do Estado de Sao Paulo. 
3. According to Barzelay and Pearson, COPERSUCAR officials claim 
that their data reflect the costs of mills that are "only somewhat less efficient 
than average" (p. 135), but they offer no substantive details. 
4. Interview with COPERSUCAR officials, May 1981. 
5. The original project goals called for the production of 10.7 billion liters 
of ethanol by 1985: 6.1 billion liters hydrated, 3.1 billion liters anhydrous, and 
1.5 billion liters as chemical feedstock. 
6. Julio Maria Martins Borges (of COPERSUCAR), "Desenvolvimento 
econ6mico, politica, energ~tica e Alcool," Proceedings of the Fourth Interna- 
tional Symposium on Alcohol Fuels Technology, Guaruji, Brazil, October 
1980, p. 759. The 4.5% estimate may understate the true cost differences, 
because it appears to account only for volume and not for production cost 
differences. In addition, autonomous distilleries also produce a by-product of 
potential value: about one-half the dried sugarcane stalks (bagasse) will be 
surplus and may be burned for rural electrification, or the fiber will be used in 
paper manufacture. Annexed distilleries generally run out of bagasse and must 
supplement with more expensive fuels such as wood and coal. In their defense, 
Barzelay and Pearson might argue that annexed distilleries benefit from econo- 
mies of scale and scope in joint production with sugar. These advantages do 
not accrue to autonomous distilleries and may counterbalance the cost differ- 
ences between anhydrous and hydrated fuel. 
7. This "base case" cost includes a shadow exchange rate. 
8. There are several apparent inconsistencies in the original article regard- 
ing social profitability in 1980-81. First, the numbers in the text for ethanol 
value do not match up with the numbers in the corresponding table 5 (pp. 142- 
43). Second, when calculating the hydrated ethanol value, the authors multiply 
the gasoline price by 0.80. The correct parameter is 0.83, because 1.0 liters of 
gasoline yields the same mileage as 1.2 liters of hydrated ethanol. Thus, 1.0 
liter hydrated ethanol = 0.83 liters gasoline. 
9. This loss would be further reduced to $0.01 per liter, assuming, e.g., 
that the overestimation in cost data was 25% rather than 20%. The "reported 
COPERSUCAR cost" of anhydrous ethanol is $0.30. Because hydrated 
ethanol costs 4.5% less, hydrated ethanol's reported cost is slightly less than 
$0.29. If these costs are overvalued by 25% rather than 20%, the base cost of 
ethanol would be $0.21 per liter: (.30) (.955) (.75) = .21. 
10. See Borges; Alan Poole, "A Working Paper on Ethanol and Methanol 
as Alternatives for Petroleum Substitution in Brazil," mimeographed (Sao 
Paulo: Institute of Physics, 1979); Jonathan B. Wight, "Economies and Dis- 
economies of Scale in Ethanol Fuel Production: The Experience in Brazil" 
(Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1982). 
11. The alcohol program had ambitious social objectives for rural areas, 
such as more balanced interregional growth, improved opportunities for small 
farmers, and the creation of rural industrial employment to reduce migration to 
cities. Proilcool will create about 30,000 jobs in distilleries and 270,000 jobs in 
agriculture, according to Borges. Still, Barzelay and Pearson correctly note 
that "most of the incremental alcohol production has taken place on large 
plantation-mill-distillery complexes in the relatively wealthy central-south" (p. 
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132) and much of this new alcohol production has displaced food crops, esp. in 
Sao Paulo. (For further discussion, see Eli Roberto Pelin, "The Impact of 
Brazil's Proilcool on Land Prices and Crop Substitutions," Proceedings of the 
Fourth International Symposium on Alcohol Fuels Technology, GuarujB, 
Brazil, October 1980, pp. 831-38.) 
12. Ministry of Energy and Mines, Balango energitico nacional, 1983, p. 
10; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 
1984), pp. 100-102. 
13. "Brazilian Energy Model," Ministry of Energy and Mines, Version 2 
(May 1981). 
14. World sugar prices fell from $276/ton to $136/ton during 1982, largely 
as a consequence of European sugar beet subsidies, competition from corn 
sweeteners, and the world recession. Brazil's sugar export earnings conse- 
quently fell 51%, while those for soybeans fell 34%. Coffee earnings, by con- 
trast, rose 15% because of the coffee cartel. Figures are from Conjuntura 
econ6mica 37 (February 1983): 162. 
15. Ethanol is by no means a panacea for the energy problem, as Barzelay 
and Pearson note when discussing the diesel fuel bottleneck. In addition, Proil- 
cool may exacerbate problems in land distribution, food production, and by- 
product pollution. 
16. Quoted in "Delfim: Proilcool 6 fator inflationirio," O Estado de Sdo 
Paulo (November 27, 1980). 
17. "One Million Alcohol Cars," Brazil Energy 4 (May 25, 1983): 5. 
18. Although France, the United States, and Germany are the technologi- 
cal leaders in ethanol production methods, the Brazilians provide proven and 
simple technology to countries with little skilled labor. 
19. "Os novos horizontes da 
exportaqao," Exame, special ed. (May 1983), pp. 51-54, esp. 52. 
20. One could argue, as the World Bank does, that this "insurance pre- 
mium" be paid by a tax on imported petroleum. 
